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consumers. The attorney general's
expert witnesses, moreover, testified
that consumers probably would not
spend time to identify specific products
and then phone to receive warnings.
The experts explained that impulse
motivates two-thirds of grocery buy-
ing decisions and that consumers typi-
cally decline to research inexpensive
purchases.
Expert testimony also established
that the Council's store signs were
inconspicuous, that the newspaper ad-
vertisements were infrequent, and that
the phone line's taped messages would
likely discourage all but the most dili-
gent consumers. The court recognized
that the small number of warnings the
Council provided in its first year re-
sulted from consumers' assumption of
product safety, rather than from their
apathy. One expert testified that the
least effective product label would con-
vey warnings required under the Act
more effectively than the Council's
toll-free phone system. *
- Matthew Brady
Only Plaintiffs Can
Constitutionally Receive
Punitive Damages
In Smith v. States General Life Ins.
Co., 592 So. 2d 1021 (Ala. 1992), the
Alabama Supreme Court held that a
trial court lacks the authority to allo-
cate a portion of a constitutionally
valid punitive damage to any entity
other than a plaintiff.
Fraudulent Insurance
Martin B. Smith ("Smith") pur-
chased a medical insurance policy from
Fred White ("White"). At the time of
the purchase, White represented to Smith
that the insurance company would re-
consider certain conditions excluded
from the policy one year later. White
stated that if, upon the reconsideration
of the policy a year later, Smith's
physical condition remained stable or
improved, the insurance company would
delete the exclusions.
The actual policy, which was issued
by States General Life Insurance Com-
pany ("States"), included States' stan-
dard "Reconsideration Privilege." This
provision also indicated that States
would consider deleting any exclusions
one year after the issuance of the policy.
Smith sued States, White, and
White's employer, The Barton Agency
("Defendants"), claiming fraud in and
about the sale of a policy for medical
insurance coverage. Smith alleged that
the Defendants never intended to re-
consider the policy exclusions. In ad-
dition, Smith stated that the Defen-
dants intended to deceive him in an
effort to induce him to buy the policy.
Smith filed his claim and presented
his case to a jury. The jury awarded
Smith punitive damages of $250,000
and compensatory damages of $600.
The Defendants filed several post-trial
motions asserting that the punitive dam-
age award was excessive.
Mini-Van Recall
Ford Motor Co. and Nissan Motor Co. have recalled some 1993-model
mini-vans because the vehicles may have suffered accidental fuel hose cuts
during assembly. The 1,700 vehicles recalled are the Mercury Villager and
the Nissan Quest, which are the products of a joint venture between Ford
and Nissan and which are built side-by-side at a plant in Avon Lake, Ohio.
The fuel-hose problem may cause fuel leaks in those vehicles.
Sorry Insurance Company
Based on its conclusion that the
punitive damage award was within the
jury's authority, the trial court denied
the Defendants' motions. The trial
court based its evaluation of the puni-
tive damages on statutory law and two
Alabama cases, Hammond v. City of
Gadsden, 493 So. 2d 1374 (Ala. 1986)
and Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.
2d 218 (Ala. 1989). In accordance
with the applicable statute, Ala. Code
§ 6-11-23, and these cases, the court
found that the punitive damage award
was proper and an appropriate tool
with which to punish the Defendants.
Specifically, the trial court noted
that the award represented a windfall to
Smith and would injure, but not seri-
ously affect, States. The court also
determined that the punitive award was
not related to the compensatory award.
In addition, the court considered the
high degree of reprehensibility and the
pattern of conduct employed by States.
Although the court found that States
had ample opportunity to remedy the
situation, it noted that States had nei-
ther acknowledged nor made any at-
tempt to remedy the wrong.
The trial court proceeded to allocate
one-half of the punitive damages
awarded to Smith to the American
Heart Association. In so doing, the
court relied on the concurring opinion
in Fuller v. Preferred Risk Life Ins.
Co., 577 So. 2d 878 (Ala. 1991) in
which Justice Shores stated that trial
courts have the inherent power to allo-
cate punitive damages. Within this
power, the court could allocate an award
in a way that would serve the purposes
behind punitive damages to a greater
degree than to grant the whole award to
the plaintiff. An appeal was filed and
taken to the Alabama Supreme Court.
Punitive Damage Award Was Proper
The Supreme Court of Alabama
upheld the $250,000 punitive damage
award. The court noted that based on
the trial court's findings, there was no
evidence indicating that the jury's ver-
dict was founded on improper motives
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or that the Defendants had been de-
prived of their property without due
process of the law.
Allocation of Punitive Damage
Beyond Court's Authority
The Alabama Supreme Court, how-
ever, reversed the trial court's alloca-
tion of one-half the punitive damages
to the American Heart Association. In
reversing, the court relied on the ma-
jority opinion in Fuller. In Fuller, the
court held that it is the function of the
jury to determine the appropriate
amount of punitive damages. Further-
more, the court relying on Barry v.
Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550 (1886), noted
the U.S. Supreme Court's recognition
of the jury's sole authority in this area.
The court also recognized the trial
court's authority to grant a new trial or
a reduction of an excessive jury ver-
dict. However, the court noted that
these exercises of authority were only
appropriate upon a finding that the jury
verdict was flawed. Since the trial
court specifically held that the verdict
in this case was not flawed, the alloca-
tion of the damages to any other party
except Smith was improper.
Concurring and Dissenting
Opinions
Justices Shores and Steagall both
agreed with the majority's opinion re-
garding the punitive damage award.
However, they both indicated that a
court has the authority to allocate a
portion of punitive damages to another
entity besides the plaintiff. Justice
Shores noted that many legal scholars
support partial allocation as furthering
the cause of justice.
Justice Steagall advocated a limit on
the court's authority to direct awards
into Alabama's general state fund. How-
ever, Steagall stated that no limit for
the allocation to a state's fund was
necessary if it served the public inter-
est. Furthermore, Judge Shores noted
that the purposes of punitive damages,
punishment and deterrence, would be
accomplished even if the court awarded
punitive damages to someone other
than the plaintiff.
The justices noted that since a plain-
tiff does not have a constitutional right
to punitive damages, no cause of action
results when a court allocates a portion
of these damages to an entity other than
the plaintiff. Similarly, a defendant's
right to a fair trial is not impaired if a
portion of the damages assessed by the
jury is allocated to an entity other than
the plaintiff. o,*o
- JoAnne Juliano Giger
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